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Most working-age people in modern industrial societies 
principally manage their finances by reference to their 
direct and regular income from their employment. 
This suggests that when they move into retirement, the 
large majority (but not necessarily all) would feel most 
comfortable in continuing to have a significant degree 
of regular income, preferably commensurate with their 
income pre-retirement.
Policy in New Zealand on retirement income from 1992 
up until recently has had two main features:
•	 New	Zealand	Superannuation,	providing	a	flat-rate,	
residence-based pension at about 32% of national 
average earnings for each member of a married 
couple and 39% of national average earnings for a 
person living alone; and
•	 government	support	for	financial	education	through	
the office of the Retirement Commissioner, with the 
objective that New Zealanders will be equipped to plan 
for their retirement and know how to save sufficient 
to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living 
through into retirement, should they so choose.
As a crude rule of thumb, it is often stated that people 
wanting to maintain living standards into retirement 
should plan for income in retirement at a level of 70-75% 
of their pre-retirement income, reflecting lower costs 
(such as not needing to travel to work, or having acquired 
durables or provided for the future purchase thereof, etc).1 
But New Zealand Superannuation on its own will fall well 
short for many people in meeting a 70-75% replacement 
rate target, even those on average incomes.2
In the past, but to an increasingly lesser extent now, some 
people could expect a pension from their employer’s 
pension scheme, particularly those who worked 
most of their lives for the government, or for large 
organisations such as banks, insurance companies and 
petrol companies. However, as the result of reforms in 
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the late 1980s, most notably the removal of a special tax 
treatment that had recognised occupational pensions as 
deferred pay, such pension schemes have mostly either 
wound up, been converted to defined contribution and/
or closed to new entrants.3
Of course, a number of people will not have assets over 
and above what they want to keep by way of precautionary 
savings and/or for bequests. Some people may have needs 
met by family on a regular basis and hence have less call 
for cash income. But for those who have accumulated 
‘excess’ assets, practical ways to decumulate them – i.e. 
convert them into a regular income – presents an issue 
not as yet high on the retirement income policy agenda. 
(One might add that the introduction of KiwiSaver4 in 
the 2005 Budget, and particularly the enhanced version 
announced in the 2007 Budget, makes it likely that 
many more working people will arrive at retirement with 
financial assets to supplement their retirement income 
from New Zealand Superannuation.)
The current position in New Zealand is that obtaining 
regular supplementary income in retirement from 
accumulated retirement assets will, in the absence of any 
change, rely principally on either the drawing down of 
those assets in a structured fashion, or the purchase of 
an annuity from a life insurance office. 
1 See, for example, Munnell and Soto (2005). These are in respect 
of gross incomes.
2 Note that a full discussion of replacement rates should take into 
account living arrangements (i.e. whether a person is partnered or 
living alone) and housing arrangements (i.e. whether mortgage-free 
or paying rent).
3 Currently the average ‘in-force’ pension per capita in the 65+ age 
group is about $1,400 per annum. By 2050, in the absence of any 
policy change, the author estimates that this will fall to about $65 
per annum, as the result of a fall in in-force pensions compounded 
by increased numbers of persons 65 and over.
4 KiwiSaver is an auto-enrolment-based, national, defined contribution 
savings scheme, introduced in response to observed negative 
household savings rates and falling coverage of occupational 
retirement schemes. KiwiSaver has certain capped incentives, and 
will provide lump sums at age 65.
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The differences and similarities between 
annuitisation and draw down
Draw down is the process of determining what regular 
amount one can take out of one’s savings over a fixed 
period so that the money (including investment return 
from the diminishing capital) runs out at a fixed point, 
usually set as one’s expectation of life. Annuitisation 
is applying the savings in the purchase of an annuity, 
conventionally from a life insurance company; the 
provider guarantees to pay you a regular amount for as 
long as you live.
In both cases an assessment has to be made of the 
investment return over the likely period of the payments. 
In the case of draw down, this is needed to calculate 
the regular payments to be taken over the given pre-
determined period. For an annuity, the expected return 
is one of the main factors used to calculate the annuity 
payment, the others being mortality and expenses. 
A person utilising draw down may insulate themselves to 
some extent against investment risk by investing in fixed 
interest bonds of appropriate dates, or in a guaranteed 
Early death Prolonged life
Longevity insurance Benefit goes to other participants in 
the insured pool 
Participant benefits through 
maintained income
Draw down Benefit goes to the heirs Family or children needed to provide 
support
Table 1: Contrast of longevity insurance and draw down
Expenses also arise in both cases. Investment management 
fees are likely to be incurred, as well as transaction 
costs of various kinds, including advisor fees and/or 
commissions in the case of draw down. Some people 
utilising draw down may do their own calculations and 
their own investment, but it can be risky without the 
appropriate skills, and in Australia professional advice on 
draw down is widespread. It appears a priori likely that 
annuity provision will usually incur lower direct costs.
Under draw down, death earlier than expected causes 
an unintended bequest to the estate. Death later than 
expected will leave the person with no income. Under 
annuitisation, there is protection for as long as one 
lives – but on early death, at least under conventional 
annuity contracts, there is no refund. 
To summarise, the principal differences then are the 
flexibility inherent in draw down (since one has access 
to one’s capital), and the guarantee for life inherent in 
annuitisation. The following schematic was proposed 
by a reader of an earlier draft of this article, Andrei 
Andreianov, to summarise the differences between 
draw down and the longevity insurance that is the key 
characteristic of annuitisation.
return fund. The annuity provider, because they are 
guaranteeing the payment, may make use of derivatives 
and other financial instruments to insulate the return. 
In both cases there is a cost associated with removing 
variability in investment return, although the annuity 
provider is likely to be able to do this more cheaply on 
a wholesale basis, rather than retail.
Someone using draw down may prefer to take a higher-
risk approach, usually taking professional financial 
advice. Annuity providers could offer an annuity which 
varies with the movement in some index fund, but this 
is not available in New Zealand, and not understood 
to be widely prevalent elsewhere.
Clearly, maintenance of an assured level of income (or 
equivalent goods and services) is possible under draw 
down if there is an effective contract between the retired 
person and their heirs that, on early death, the heirs 
benefit through a bequest; but if life is prolonged, the 
heirs are obliged to find resources to continue support. 
Effectively the heirs are taking on the longevity risk in 
an informal (and legally unenforceable) fashion.5
For those, however, for whom such a contract is not 
possible, or appears too risky, the presence of a functional 
5 Pigott et al. (2004) refer to a paper by F. Hayashi, J. Altonji and 
L. Kotlikoff (1996), ‘Risk-sharing between and within families’, 
Econometrica, 64, pp.261-94, which shows that risk-sharing through 
transfers is limited even within families.
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longevity insurance market would seem important. The 
comparison over time of the actual return from draw 
down with purchase of an annuity presented in Figure 
1 gives emphasis to this. Here a level real return of 3.5% 
per annum from draw down is compared to the annual 
accumulated return to a survivor under an annuity 
priced on the same return on the backing investments. 
(New Zealand life tables 2000–2002 All Males mortality 
is assumed; the expectation of life is about 17 years.)
On death within the first 11 years, the annuity purchaser 
receives a negative return on their investment. At 13 
years, however, some four years before the median 
expected period of survival of 17 years is attained, the 
annualised return matches that for the draw down. An 
increasing average return is obtained thereafter for each 
further year of survival – 3% per annum more already 
by the 17-year point. The initial negative return may 
appear unattractive; but if one has died, this is of little 
consequence, while if one survives, the markedly greater 
return is obvious.6
Wakeling and Yang (2000) make this point in another 
way, demonstrating that even the most economically 
efficient form of draw down is around 30% less efficient 
Figure 1: Comparison of annualised real return from draw down and annuity
than annuitisation in terms of effective utilisation of 
capital set aside to provide income in one’s retirement. 
One should also note there is further risk inherent in 
draw down not captured here, not just the possibility 
of greater transaction costs, but the exposure to family 
pressure and potential fraud because of the flexibility 
of access to one’s capital.
Longevity insurance examined
Having demonstrated the significant theoretical 
advantage of annuitisation over draw down, the question 
then is why is there not greater demand, and greater 
supply. To respond to this, it is useful to first illustrate 
how longevity insurance works.
This is done here by an example of pooling of longevity 
risk on a collective basis (i.e. without a guarantor). An 
initial cohort of 1,000 male 65 year olds is assumed 
to contribute $100,000 initially to an annuity-paying 
fund. An investment return of 3.5% per annum real is 
assumed over the period, net of all expenses, and pricing 
is assumed to allow for increases of 2% per annum in line 
with anticipated price inflation. Finally, it is assumed 
that mortality will be in line with the New Zealand life 
tables 2000–2002 All Males table. The initial amount of 
pension is broadly of the order of $9,000 per annum.
6 These results are relatively insensitive to the assumptions made.
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Twenty simulations are run to derive a series of 
stochastic outcomes within the expected probability 
distribution. In this exercise, it is assumed pensions are 
re-balanced at the end of each year. At each balance 
date after commencement, each surviving member has 
an asset share calculated, being the asset share at the 
start of the year, decreased by own pension payments 
and the share of tax and expenses, and increased 
by the share of investment return and ‘fall-in’ from 
deceased members. This asset share represents the 
relative interest of continuing members. The pension 
supported by the asset share is then obtained by re-
pricing on the original pricing assumptions, allowing 
for the further year of age.
The first chart, Figure 2, shows outcomes assuming 
all participants are subject to the same force of age-
related mortality. There is a reasonable degree of 
closeness of outcome over the first 10–15 years, but 
then results become more variable as the number of 
survivors falls. After 25 years of operation – i.e. by age 
90 – results become quite variable. In this example 
no pension actually falls until around age 87, but 
around half have increases less than that assumed in 
the pricing basis.
The heavy black line shows the average over the 20 
simulations, and the heavy grey line the expected 
result. In this example it will be seen that over these 20 
simulations the average is close to the expected until 
very near the end, after age 98.
To illustrate the effect of participants being admitted 
into this arrangement with mortality prospects different 
from the assumed risk, Figure 3 shows the results of 20 
runs where 90% have the mortality on which pricing 
and re-pricing is based, while 10% have lower mortality 
(higher longevity), giving an extra three years’ life 
expectancy at age 65. 
Initially, results do not depart greatly from those 
expected. However, after 5–10 years the average starts 
to fall, reflecting the presence of some low-mortality 
participants who, as a result of not dying as quickly 
as assumed, cause asset shares to fall (since there are 
more survivors amongst whom the fund must be 
shared) and consequently lower pension amounts to 
be declared.
Eventually, the average pension amount over the 
20 simulations (shown in grey) falls even below the 
expected level for lower-mortality pricing; this is because 
the mortality adopted for pricing purposes gives too high 
a pension and erodes the fund.
Figure 2: Pension amounts by attained age, 20 simulations of 1,000 entrants, table AM(C)
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Figure 3: Pension amounts by attained age, 20 simulations of 1,000 entrants, table AM(C) 
mixed with 10% low mortality
Figure 4: Pension amounts by attained age, 20 simulations of 1,000 entrants, table AM(C) 
mixed with 30% low mortality
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Figure 5: Pension amounts by attained age, 20 simulations of 1,000 entrants, table AM(C) 
mixed with 10% high mortality
Figure 6: Pension amounts by attained age, 20 simulations of 1,000 entrants, table AM(C) 
mixed with 30% high mortality
V
ol
um
e 
4,
 N
um
be
r 
1 
20
08
32
•	 If	 the	mortality	 experience	of	 the	pool	–	 i.e.,	 the	
number of deaths – starts to diverge outside what 
could be anticipated from random fluctuations, 
this is a warning to (a) re-assess one’s mortality 
assumption promptly for future contracts, and (b) 
set up loss reserves.
There is, in fact, considerable heterogeneity in mortality; 
refer, for example, to Blakely, Fawcett, Atkinson, Tobias 
and Cheung (2003), where disparity according to socio-
economic factors is identified in New Zealand. The 
absence of annuities priced according to appropriate 
rating factors, such as, for example, income, education, 
family history of mortality, smoking, etc, leads to 
what may well be perceived to be unfair results. It 
emphasises the results reported in some of the literature, 
that annuitisation which does not reflect reasonable 
perceptions of one’s mortality risk will be seen as unfair 
and hence not utilised.
The impact of systemic longevity risk
Implicit in the simulation process used above is that there 
is an appropriate probability distribution for the expected 
mortality, and that the insurance problem is confined to 
idiosyncratic risk, i.e. random fluctuations. Unfortunately, 
there is now considerable doubt as to the rate at which 
future improvements in longevity will occur. 
The problem is not that there are improvements; 
demographers and actuaries have incorporated estimates 
of longevity improvement in their projections for some 
time now. What has become evident in recent years, 
however, is that these projections have been wrong, 
and, of more concern, that there is no sound basis on 
which to forecast the future levels of improvement in 
a manner suitable for insurance.8 Cohort effects have 
been detected, but the drivers are not as yet understood.9 
While some maintain that past levels of improvement 
Figure 4 shows outcomes where 30% rather than 10% 
of the initial participants have lower mortality than 
that assumed.
Here the effect of over-provisioning – that is, re-pricing 
on the basis of mortality higher than would be expected 
by 30% of participants – is rather more marked, with 
the average falling faster. Note that the low-mortality 
group still initially benefit from participating, but will 
suffer erosion of the size of their pensions after age 85 
unless the mortality pricing assumption is changed. 
The next two figures, 5 and 6, show the results where 
the minority participants have high mortality and 
hence lower longevity (around three years lower) than 
that assumed.
In the 10% case, the pension levels are only a little better 
than expected in the initial period, but after 10 years the 
effect of having more people than expected die causes 
the available funds to increase and higher pensions to 
become payable. The profits are eventually such, in these 
simulations, that survivors at the end receive pensions 
commensurate with what would have been payable 
under the high mortality assumption – although for 20 
years, actual high-mortality participants will have had 
lower pensions than they would have expected. 
Unsurprisingly, in the 30% case the impact of having a 
larger group of participants with higher mortality than 
assumed for the pricing leads to pension levels rising 
rather more sharply. The period for which the higher-
mortality participants receive less than actuarially fair 
pensions is reduced to 15 years, but the actual numbers 
surviving past that time will of course be relatively few.
These illustrations demonstrate three particular features 
of longevity insurance for a guarantor such as a life 
insurance company.
•	 Even	within	a	known	mortality	distribution	there	
will still remain a good degree of variation if numbers 
of insured are relatively small. This idiosyncratic 
longevity risk, as it is termed, has to be catered for 
by the guarantor of the annuity, through reinsurance 
and/or holding capital fluctuation reserves.
•	 Good	risk	assessment	and	classification,	known	as	
underwriting, is essential. For the guarantor, the risk 
to be guarded against is people with mortality lower 
than anticipated; hence pricing tends to be based on 
the best lives.7
7 The extensive literature on annuitisation has mostly focused on a 
‘whole of population’ mortality. The so-called ‘annuity puzzle’, relating 
to what appears to be a higher price for annuities than would be 
expected by reference to population mortality, is in fact explained by 
the fact that those who voluntarily purchase annuities generally expect 
to have better than average mortality – and life insurance companies 
price their products accordingly. Compulsory purchase of annuities 
required in the United Kingdom is, however, leading to the availability 
of underwritten ‘impaired lives’ annuities in that market.
8 Possible market solutions to the problems of insurance of this 
systemic longevity risk have been discussed; see, for example, 
Antolin and Blommestein (2007), and Blake, Cairns and Dowd 
(2006). These suggest that the problem of being unable to 
adequately quantify the risk remains a significant obstacle.
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will continue for the foreseeable future, others suggest, 
noting the rise of obesity and binge behaviours, that the 
improvement in longevity observed over the last century 
could level out or even reverse.
This uncertainty as to the future direction and extent 
of longevity improvement is referred to as systemic 
longevity risk. It applies in all developed countries, and 
is affecting the provision of annuities, since the risk is 
not hedgeable on financial markets. 
Policy issues 
The simple statement of the problem is that while 
longevity insurance through annuitisation presents 
marked theoretical advantages for the provision of 
regular income in retirement over the draw down 
alternative, it appears to be unattractive to those who 
might be expected to use it. The under-utilisation 
represents an economic loss which it is arguably desirable 
to try to mitigate.
The discussion in this paper so far has focused on the 
supply side issues around longevity insurance:
•	 managing	idiosyncratic	longevity	risk:	in	the	New	
Zealand market the small numbers are likely to result 
in a guarantor pricing only for the low-mortality 
group, as scale will not make it worthwhile to 
underwrite, and the guarantor will need to hold 
capital reserves (or completely reinsure), adding to 
the cost of provision;
•	 systemic	mortality	risk:	as	it	is	highly	problematic	
to reinsure or to hedge this, potential providers may 
not wish to enter the market, or at the least will see 
a need to price conservatively, losing part or all of 
the comparative advantage over draw down.
Other supply side issues include investment and tax. 
As noted briefly, investment of the assets backing an 
annuity, if the payments are fixed, has to be in low-
risk instruments of appropriate maturities (to avoid 
reinvestment risk); in New Zealand, government bonds 
are relatively short-dated and hence not of enough 
length. It is also generally considered desirable for 
annuities to preserve purchasing power by being linked 
to price inflation, but inflation-indexed bonds are not 
available here. Whether the market could innovate by 
offering annuities linked to some replicatable investment 
index is a moot question.
Tax has not been mentioned. Briefly, taxation of 
annuity products in New Zealand is opaque, coming 
under life insurance company tax legislation. Ideally, 
the tax on the accrual of the earnings on investment 
of the backing assets would be neutral, but this 
would require a major rethink as to how annuities are 
provided (and taxed).
Turning to the demand side, the problems relate 
principally to the perceived lack of flexibility compared 
to draw down – handing over one’s money for an 
annuity is rather final in that regard. A lack of trust 
in a lightly regulated financial services sector can be 
argued to be perfectly rational, given the complexity 
of longevity insurance; and the lock-in to low-yielding 
investments in return for a guarantee may not be well 
understood, nor easily explainable, given the product’s 
lack of transparency. And perhaps one of the strongest 
factors affecting demand may be a sense of poor value 
for money if one is not in perfect health with long-lived 
parents, in the absence of any attempt to underwrite.
This analysis therefore suggests that even were there 
to be greater education as to the perils of not insuring 
longevity risk through buying annuities, it is unlikely 
that insurance companies would be able to provide 
annuities at a price that would be perceived as acceptable 
by the general population. Possibly, some employers 
might consider reverting to taking on some longevity 
risk for their employees by underwriting occupational 
pensions, but this seems only likely if there are sound 
labour market reasons for doing so.
Policy responses
One can identify three main policy options to address 
the current inability to obtain meaningful longevity 
insurance.10 These are:
•	 Do	nothing,	noting	that	New	Zealand	Superannuation	
provides at least a certain amount of longevity 
insurance, and that the greater retirement savings 
resulting from the KiwiSaver initiative may possibly 
lead in future to a market solution emerging without 
government involvement.
9 For a full description of New Zealand cohort mortality, refer to 
Statistics New Zealand (2006).
10 One could also consider making KiwiSaver proceeds available only 
as an annuity. Putting to one side the argument as to the merits or 
otherwise of this, the resultant annuity would still have to be provided 
in one of the three ways discussed here.
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•	 At	the	other	extreme,	have	the	state	enter	the	market	
and establish a not-for-profit annuity fund offering 
CPI-indexed annuities.11
•	 As	 an	 intermediate	 position,	 consider	 facilitating	
the introduction of annuitised funds, under which 
participants self-pool their longevity and other risks 
on a collective and fully transparent basis. 
If the argument is accepted that systemic longevity risk 
is not currently hedgeable, nor likely to become so in 
the near future, then a viable private annuity market 
under option 1 is unlikely – there is no sound basis for 
the private sector to accept the risk, except by charging 
prices that will deter most potential purchasers.
This will be particularly so when the disparity in expected 
mortality conditioned on such factors as income, gender, 
education, family history of mortality, smoking, etc is 
taken into account. Effectively, the potential insured 
population does not have the conventional single risk 
category (i.e. male or female) but a wider number of 
categories, implying a greater number of smaller risk 
pools. With a population the size of New Zealand’s, any 
expectation of being able to hedge systemic longevity 
risk through private markets then becomes extremely 
small – even idiosyncratic longevity risk is difficult.
Options 2 and 3 would then seem more promising if New 
Zealanders are to have viable access to longevity insurance. 
But since the state is already providing longevity insurance 
through the state pension system at significant levels for 
those accustomed to lower incomes – although rather 
less so for the middle and higher income groups – it 
may be difficult to get acceptance of a state-supported 
annuity fund. Also, although longevity insurance would 
be addressed, this would not necessarily solve any of the 
other demand and supply side issues as noted above, were 
traditional annuity products only on offer.
There is, therefore, scope to explore whether option 
3, encouraging self-insurance through facilitating 
the introduction of annuitised funds, is worth 
consideration. As noted earlier, the basic features of 
annuitised funds are:
•	 self-pooling	of	longevity	risk;
•	 self-pooling	of	investment	risk.
For a fuller discussion, Wadsworth, Findlater and 
Boardman (2001) provide an innovative introduction 
to the topic, and Daykin (2004) and Pigott, Valdez and 
Detzel (2004) expand on the theoretical aspects. The 
example given earlier in this article of re-balancing each 
year reflects the basic operational principles.
The annuitised fund certainly has a number of 
advantages compared to traditional annuity product, 
while retaining the economic advantage over draw 
down. Some of these are:
•	 The	investment	risk	in	annuitised	funds	is	borne	by	
the fund members. According to appetite for risk, 
this could permit greater holdings of growth assets 
in an annuitised fund than with a conventional 
annuity provider. Furthermore, there may be scope 
for individualised investment holdings, which would 
then allow someone to transfer their pre-retirement 
accumulated assets directly without incurring buying 
and selling costs.
•	 Tax	of	the	income	derived	from	investments	could	
be tied to each participant’s tax status, perhaps most 
efficiently by using imputation credits.
•	 The	restriction	on	access	to	one’s	funds	in	traditional	
annuity products could be lifted to some degree, since 
the asset share of each participant is known (at least 
on balance dates). Actually permitting access would, 
of course, be conditional on the demonstration of 
continued good health, at the applicant’s expense.
There do, however, remain some difficulties. A key 
outcome of an annuitised fund is spreading of longevity 
risk; a key concern is that risk be fairly borne by 
participants. Ensuring appropriate risk assessment for 
the pools would be essential, and require some resource 
put into research and setting national standards. Trusted 
regulation would also be needed.
The longevity insurance simulations also demonstrated 
that at older ages, when few are left in the pool, 
results become highly random. It may be that paying 
out participants at some age such as 95 would be 
desirable.
While in theory annuitised funds should absorb all 
idiosyncratic risk, there may be greater attractiveness 
were the state to at least provide stop loss insurance on 
a cost neutral basis; i.e. for deaths fewer than a certain 
lower limit the state would provide a subsidy, in return 
11 Some might suggest indexing to net wage increases, as is done for 
New Zealand Superannuation; however, pricing of such annuities 
is highly problematic, if not impossible.
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for a payment should deaths exceed a certain upper 
limit. This would be appropriate if, as suggested, the 
state sets the risk assessment standards.
As Antolin and Blommestein (2007) indicate, systemic 
risk will probably need to be absorbed to some extent 
by governments if longevity insurance is to flourish. 
Annuitised funds could either self-absorb systemic as well 
as idiosyncratic risk, subject to the stop loss insurance 
arrangement described above, or alternatively revise the 
mortality basis for re-balancing from time to time as 
and when it became apparent that the extent to which 
improvement in longevity allowed for in the mortality 
basis was out of line with up-to-date best practice. This 
latter arrangement would devolve the systemic risk 
completely onto participants; a quid pro quo might be a 
favourable tax treatment, or some other ‘sweetener’.
Conclusion
This paper has made the argument that there is a clear 
theoretical advantage in utilising annuitisation rather 
than draw down from an efficiency perspective. In 
practice, in the current state of the market, traditional 
annuity products are not attractive, and, even with 
better education as to their merits, are unlikely to 
address the needs of those other than the very healthy, 
or with sufficient means to assure themselves of the 
very best health treatment. The ‘do nothing’ option 
is therefore rejected.
The option of the state stepping in to provide traditional 
annuity products is also rejected, on the grounds that the 
external guarantor model remains unworkable even were 
the state prepared to take on the systemic and idiosyncratic 
longevity risk on the grounds of market failure.
The option of facilitating self-insurance is shown to 
address a number of the disadvantages of traditional 
annuity products. There would, however, appear to 
remain a need for some state intervention, not least, it 
is suggested, a sound basis for assessing broad mortality 
risk categories, and some form of stop-loss insurance.
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